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1 
Abstract  
 
This paper examines the causes of the resurgence of populism and nationalism in status              
quo Central and Eastern Europe. It analyzes the case studies of Poland, Hungary, and Czech               
Republic in order to test the two explanations of this resurgence. The proposed explanations              
include effects of transition as the causes of the observed phenomenon, while the second one               
emphasizes the process of EU accession as the primary cause. The findings support that the loss                
of social welfare benefits during transition contribute to the success of populist parties. In              
addition, the unique political situation of CEECs that had allowed populist parties to gain              
opposition spots through which it was convenient to promote an anti-establishment agenda. The             
accession to the EU in 2004 did not directly contribute to a negative perception of democracy or                 
support for populist parties, however, democratic deficit of the EU and lack of coherent and               
sensible policy allowed the populist parties to use the EU as “the elite” against which they could                 
mobilize support. I conclude that support of populist and nationalist parties heavily depends on              
post-truth and construction of economic issues, which is the same political strategy used by              
parties and politicians both in CEECs and other European states.  
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3 
Introduction  
The accession of Eastern bloc countries to the European Union is deemed as a prominent               
event of post-Cold War history. The former Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe have               
joined the supranational body through a lengthy process of accession that started in 1989. For the                
CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries) this event was an important historic mark of              
their transition from the communist system to democratic rule, as well as their reunion with the                
family of European nations. Although the historical and political significance of the enlargement             
was evident, opposition from member states and lack of accession mechanisms in the design of               
the European Union lengthened the already complicated accession process. The Czech President            
at the time, Vaclav Havel, warned that delaying welcoming the CEECs to the union posed many                
dangers including “the growth of various nationalist and populist movements” and even an             
emergence of a “new iron curtain” between the East and West of Europe. Despite of the                1
difficulties, eight former communist states joined the supranational body on May 1st, 2004, and              
due to the high level of support for European integration the accession was celebrated across               
Central and Eastern Europe. Later a 2008 World Bank report had even stated that the Visegrád                
Four (including ​Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia​) were able to create “stable             
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection              
of minorities”, as well as “functioning market economies”. The post-accession period, though            2
received differing analyses, was in general regarded as the movement of CEECs towards             
1 Vaclav Havel as quoted in The Irish Times. “Havel Warns on Delay of Enlargement.” ​The Irish Times​, 
The Irish Times, 15 Oct. 2002. 
2 World Bank “Unleashing Prosperity” report as quoted in Dean, Alex. “The New Nationalism: Eastern 
Europe Turns Right.” ​Prospect Magazine The New Nationalism Eastern Europe Turns Right Comments​, 
Mar. 2016. 
 
 
4 
Europeanism and integration with the former Soviet states achieving their dream of becoming             
fully integrated members of the political and economic union. 
The ​rise of nationalist, populist, and Eurosceptic parties and politicians in the countries of              
the Eastern bloc in light of recent integration has therefore attracted attention of the international               
community. Before the EU accession, nationalism in the ​Visegrád 4 was ​mostly attributed to              
defensive nationalism; however, after the EU accession these states were deemed to be on the               3
path of embracing a shared Central European identity before they have backslided to aggressive              
nationalism. The rise of nationalism and populism, which became prominent especially after the             4
Eurozone Crisis, could be traced through specific patterns of criticizing EU immigration policy,             
backsliding in the area of democratic norms, and emphasizing state sovereignty. Eurosceptic            
rhetoric of politicians such as Viktor Orbán and Andrej Babiš has gained mass support while               
simultaneously it is widely acknowledged that the EU membership brings great economic and             
security benefits to the CEECs. ​Some may contend that the trend observed in the Visegrad 4 is a                  
part of the overall rise of populism and Euroscepticism, while others state that specific economic,               
political and historical factors unique to post-Soviet states explain this resurgence. The            
resurgence of nationalism and populism in Central and Eastern Europe is currently causing             
discord on the actions of the supranational body and therefore has the potential to seriously               
undermine the union’s capacity for joint decision-making. In addition, such rhetoric has the             
3 As suggested by Ewa M. Thompson, nationalism could be distinguished between defensive and 
aggressive, with defensive nationalism present in small and middle-sized nations promoting national 
rhetoric for survival purposes rather than aggression in light of natural disasters or threat of expansionist 
neighbours, while the latter is centered around aggression and not survival. Korablyova notes that 
defensive nationalism can easily transform into the aggressive one and it could be difficult to distinguish 
the two. See Ewa M. Thompson as cited in ​Korablyova, Valeria. “The Ambiguity of Nationalism in East 
Central Europe.” ​Prague Civil Society Centre​, 21 June 2017. 
4 ​Korablyova, Valeria. “The Ambiguity of Nationalism in East Central Europe.” ​Prague Civil Society 
Centre​, 21 June 2017. 
 
 
5 
potential to undermine liberal democratic values, weakening the European Union as an actor in              
the international arena. The legacy of accession and democratic transition of CEECs as their              
celebrated and long aspired historic return to the European family may suffer from the posed               
threat to Europeanism and could even affect the membership of the countries in the supranational               
union. It is therefore essential to study why the Visegrád countries have turned to nationalism               
and populism, especially after years of political and economic integration, in order to prepare for               
the future challenges posed to EU members’ cooperation, future EU enlargement, spread of             
liberal democratic values, and the power of international organizations. 
The aim of this research paper is to examine various reasons that have contributed to the                
resurgence of nationalism and rise in populism and Euroscepticism in ​Visegrád countries through             
a study of the cases of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. The three presented cases joined                
the EU as a part of the Eastern bloc expansion in 2004. I will provide a comparative analysis of                   
how Visegrád countries are influenced by the economic and political context of the EU, as well                
as the role of the EU context and policy in explaining the popularity of nationalist and populist                 
ideas in the three respective cases. Studying the shared Soviet past, democratic transition, as well               
as the process of EU accession can illuminate how nationalist and populist movements have been               
able to politically mobilize in these countries while using criticism of the EU despite of the                
relatively recent accession and evident benefits of membership. The research paper aims to             
answer the following questions: What are the factors that explain the evident flourishing of              
nationalist movements, populism and Euroscepticism in the status quo in CEECs? Why did             
nationalist, populist, and Eurosceptic politicians and movements gain popularity in the Eastern            
bloc, which has benefitted from European economic and political integration and has aspired             
 
 
6 
historically to be a part of the shared European project? What is the role that the EU had played                   
to contribute to this development? The thesis will be structured as follows: Section 1 is dedicated                
to definitions of key terms and theoretical foundation. Section 2 provides an empirical             
background of the three selected case studies of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Section 3               
presents two hypotheses that attempt to explain the research puzzle. Section 4 provides evidence              
based on the three case studies. Section 5 analyzes the results in light of competing explanations,                
and tries to explain whether Eastern and Central European populism is unique compared to other               
movements in the European political context. Section 6, the conclusion, presents findings of the              
research as well as its limitations, and the contributions the findings make to the field and future                 
predictions.  
Theory 
It is necessary to provide the definitions of nationalism and populism and establish a              
theoretical background for the purpose of this research paper. It should be acknowledged that              
with both of the terms there is a lack of a uniform definition, and therefore the context of the use                    
of terms is important. For example, the definitions of “populism” range between ideology,             
strategy, or political style in academic works. The definitions of nationalism alone can be              5
classified under primordialist and sociobiological, instrumentalist, modernization and        
evolutionary theoretical definitions. Though this paper will explain the differences in theory,            6
that would arise for example between the Ernest Gellner's definition of a nation and the one by                 
Benedict Anderson, they are of more importance to theoretical debates of the origin of              
5 Page 146: Kessel, Stijn Van. “Like a Hurricane? The Winds of Populism​​ in Contemporary Europe.” 
Etablierungschancen Neuer Parteien​, 2016, pp. 145–162.  
6  Classification by theory/school is based on Josep R. Llobera. “Recent Theories of Nationalism.” ​Cite 
Seer X at Penn State​, The Institut De Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS), 1999. 
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nationalism and what factors are most important when trying to understand what constitutes a              
nation, whereas this research is more focused on examining the specific way that political parties               
use nationalism and populism in their discourse. Thus, the context in which nationalism and              
populism are studied is under priority consideration. While there might be a certain consensus on               
common factors that are intrinsic to populism, populism manifests itself in a distinct fashion in               
Latin American politics than it does in European politics. The difficulty of establishing a uniform               
definition, which arises from the rich theoretical heritage on nationalism and populism, should be              
properly acknowledged and although an overview of literature on the two is important, I will               
explain in what capacity the terms are used in this research, from what theoretical traditions the                
definitions arise, and how the definitions will be limited in order to pertain to the broader                
argument of this research. The definitions are limited to most prominent theoretical schools, and              
later to the specifics of the nationalism and populism in the political scene in Europe.  
Nationalism 
The subcategories of economic and politico-ideological theories of Llobera’s         
classification of authors that propose definitions of a nation and nationalism theories, as well as               
social communications theory, can illuminate definitions of nationalism in order to better            7
understand the appeal of nationalist rhetoric used by nationalist and populist parties and why              
nationalism is a powerful political ideology. Various theories attempt to explain what constructs             
a nation. Ernest Gellner’s definition focuses on the idea of inventing a nation in the age of                 
industrialization. For Gellner, a nationalist movement is one that feels satisfied with the             8
7 Classification by theory/school is based on Josep R. Llobera. “Recent Theories of Nationalism.” ​Cite 
Seer X at Penn State ​, The Institut De Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) , 1999. 
8 Ibid.  
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fulfillment of the nationalist principle, and anger at its violation. Gellner provides two             9
definitions of a nation: cultural and voluntarist. Cultural nationalism is the sharing of a culture               
among members of a nation, which includes a set of ideas, characters and ways of               
communication. The latter defines nation through a mutual recognition of members without the             
prerequisite of shared characteristics. Another economic explanation, but from a Marxist           10
perspective, is provided by Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm’s definition of a nation is focused             
around the idea of bottom-up construction. Hobsbawm asserts that ​the development of a nation              11
is "situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation", placing              
a special emphasis on language. Therefore, both Hobsbawm and Gellner emphasize the idea             12
that the nation is constructed and is intrinsically connected to the economic context of society.               
Benedict Anderson, whose definition fits the social communications theoretical subgroup, makes           
a modernization and constructivist argument of a nation both seen as limited and sovereign.              13
The cultural construction of a nation is especially evident in Anderson’s famous assertion of a               14
nation as an “imagined community”. The members of a nation, Anderson argues, still have a               
communal perception of a nation even despite of not knowing most of their compatriots, and               
therefore the nation is built based on an acknowledgement of the commonality rather than the               
9 The “nationalist principle” is often defined as the right of each nation to secede, with every nation having 
an entitlement to its own state: ​Wellman, Christopher Heath. "The Truth in the Nationalist Principle." 
Liberal Rights and Responsibilities: Essays on Citizenship and Sovereignty​: Oxford University Press, 
2013-10-01. ​Oxford Scholarship Online​. 2013-09-26. Date Accessed 23 Apr. 2018.  
10 Renan as quoted in Lucie's Blog. “Anderson versus Gellner: A Typological Comparison of Two 
Nationalism Concepts.” ​Lucie's Blog​, Blogspot , 30 May 2012.  
11 E. Zuelow, ​The Nationalism Project: Books by Author G-H​. Web. 2017 
12 Eric Hobsbawm as quoted in E. Zuelow in ​The Nationalism Project: Books by Author G-H​. Web. 2017  
13 Benedict Anderson as cited in E. Zuelow, ​The Nationalism Project: Benedict Anderson's Definition of 
"Nation."​. Web 2017 
14 E. Zuelow in ​The Nationalism Project: Books by Author A-B​. Web 2017. 
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shared commonality itself. The paper will focus on a constructivist approach, for the nationalist              15
and populist movements “construct” their definitions of what constitutes “a nation” and “the             
people” through the lens of the “imagined community”. 
Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson’s contributions to defining a nation demonstrate the           
richness of the study on the emergence of a nation, and are considered pillars of the debate on the                   
definition. The differences in defining the nation support the argument that nationalists should             
not be perceived even within one nation or ethnic group as unitary actors. The context of the                 16
nationalist movement should be examined to gain knowledge on what is understood under             
“nation”, and referring back to the Gellner's definition, what constitutes the nationalist principle             
that, if violated, would cause anger among members of the group. This paper will adopt a broad                 
definition of nation as a group of people with acknowledged commonality, the emergence of              
which is explained by the modernization school or a host of theories that emphasize the               
emergence of a nation as a result of transition from traditional to modern society. This group’s                17
following of nationalist principle creates in-group and out-group division. “Nationalism” is           18
commonly referred to explain the attitude of caring for one’s national identity, which emerges              
among members of a nation, as well as the actions undertaken in the process of seeking to                 
achieve or preserve self-determination by those members. Therefore, in this research paper,            19
15 Finkel, M. "Theories of Nationalism: A Brief Comparison of Realist and Constructivist Ideas of the 
Nation." ​Inquiries Journal​, ​8​(10). 2016.  
16 Page 22: Barrington, Lowell W. “After Independence Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial 
and Postcommunist States. ‘Nationalism and Independence.’” Edited by Lowell W. Barrington, ​University 
of Michigan Press​, University of Michigan Press, 2006.  
17 Josep R. Llobera. “Recent Theories of Nationalism.” ​Cite Seer X at Penn State ​, The Institut De 
Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS), 1999. 
18  For in-group and out-group division see Tajfel, Henri. “Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination.” 
Oxford University Press​, pp. 96–102. Lund University Cognitive Science Website. 
19 Miscevic, Nenad. “Nationalism.” ​Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, Stanford University, 29 Nov. 
2001. 
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nationalist movements would be referred to as groups of people undertaking actions that would              
align with the abovementioned attitude of caring for national identity while simultaneously            
attempting to underscore and protect it.  
Populism  
Since 1960s, the “chameleonic” nature of the concept of populism was noted, and even              
its conceptual slipperiness. The emergence of populism is often attributed to a number of              20
causes, including modernization and globalization. In populist literature, two causal mechanisms           
stand out: the “mass society thesis”, which argues that populism is caused by groups focused on                
the preservation of culture and reacting to feelings of identity loss, as well as the economic                
thesis, which argues that populism was caused by an economic incentive for support based on               
“spatial and materialist conceptions of political representations” . In this research paper,           21 22
populism will be considered under the “ideational approach”, which regards populism as an             
ideology and worldview, and how it manifests itself in the political context of Europe. Cas               23
Mudde provides the following comprehensive definition of populism: “a thin-centered ideology           
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps,             
“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an               
20 Taggart 2000 as quoted in page 3: Sergiu Gherghina and Sorina Soare,  “Introduction: Populism - A 
Sophisticated Concept and Diverse Political Realities” in “Contemporary Populism : A Controversial 
Concept and Its Diverse Forms”, edited by Sergiu Gherghina, et al., Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2013. ProQuest Ebook Central.  
21 See Downsian “economic” thesis represented in “the rational voter theorem” of voters choosing to cast 
votes based on their economic benefit: Kristof, Pete. “Voting - Relationship between Economic Factors 
and the Probability to Vote on Populist Parties: A Study of 2006 Swedish Election to Parliament.” ​DIVA​, 
JÖNKÖPING International Business School, June 2007. 
22 Pages 268-269: Rydgren (2007) as cited in Kira A. Hawkins, Madeleine Read, and Teun Pauwels 
“Populism and Its Causes” (Chapter 14) in Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal., Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa 
Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. ​The Oxford Handbook of Populism​. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2017. 
23 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'What is populism?' in Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser ​Populism: A Very Short Introduction​ (New York, 2017; online edn, Very Short Introductions 
online, Feb. 2017).  
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expression of the volonté générale ​(general will) of the people​.​” Thin-centered ideology implies             
a worldview with a restricted ideological basis and principles, and that is why populism attaches               
and even assimilates into other ideologies. There has been an attempt to highlight some              24
common concepts of populism, and they have been identified as follows: idealization of “the              
people”, statism, faith in extraordinary qualities of a leader, pervasiveness of racism, xenophobia             
and/or anti-Semitism in discourse, use of conspiracy theories, nostalgic view of the past or              
appeal to religion, anti-elitism, as well as the promotion of an organic society. The flexible               25
nature of the ideology also makes it hard to identify populism on the political arena, when often                 
populist claims can be made by parties that do not adhere to the ideology or even oppose some of                   
the abovementioned concepts.   26
Debates exist on the defining features of populism, specifically on what is meant under              
“the people”, “the elite”, and the general will. The concept of “the people” is constructed, is                
defined in relation to its opposition against “the elite”, and manifests itself in three ways. The                
people act ​as sovereign, or the locus of political power, as the common people, or the group                 
“excluded from power due to their sociocultural and socioeconomic status”, as well as the nation,               
either tied to the civic or ethnic notion of nationalism. There are two types of populism:                27
exclusive and inclusive. ​Exclusive populism manifests itself in politics in shutting out            
24 Ibid. 
25 The index created by Isaiah Berlin et al as quoted in pages 3-4: Sergiu Gherghina and Sorina Soare, 
“Introduction: Populism - A Sophisticated Concept and Diverse Political Realities” in “Contemporary 
Populism : A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms”, edited by Sergiu Gherghina, et al., 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central.  
26 Some of the mentioned concepts, such as faith in extraordinary qualities of a leader, are found in fascist 
ideology. See Matthews, Richard & Davison, Andrew. (2017). “Can Madison Trump Trump?”, 16 for more 
on fascism and populism.  
27 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'What is populism?' in Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser ​Populism: A Very Short Introduction​ (New York, 2017; online edn, Very Short Introductions 
online, Feb. 2017).  
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marginalized groups, such as Roma in Europe, while inclusive populism focuses on accepting             
marginalized groups into politics, such as in the political context of Latin America. “The elite”               28
is often referred to the politically powerful group which stands in opposition to “the people” and                
has previously betrayed them through its abuse of power and corruption. As a consequence the               
current elite has to be replaced by populist leaders in order to adequately represent “the people”.               
As for the general will, it embodies the ability of oppressed groups to challenge the elite                 29
imposed status quo in defense of their political demands, which represent their interest and              
“common sense”, often through democratic mechanisms such as referenda. It may lead to dreams              
of anti-political utopias and authoritarian tendencies. In this research paper, populist           30
movements will be those who could be identified as promoting the ideology of exclusive              
populism and manifest commonly identified populist core ideas and principles within the            
European political context.  
Nationalism and Populism: Differences and Similarities of Concepts  
The interchangeable use of terms of nationalism and populism in discourse is erroneous,             
which is illustrated by the abovementioned differences in theoretical background and definitions            
of the two. However, there are a host of reasons why the two often accompany each other,                 
especially in the attempt to describe the political scene in Europe. Benjamin de Cleen asserts that                
the concepts of nationalism and populism are closely related empirically and conceptually and             
28“What Is Populism?” The Economist Explains, ​The Economist​, The Economist Newspaper, 19 Dec. 
2016.  
29 Christa Deiwiks. “Populism.” ​Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and 
University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009​, ETH Zurich, June 2009.  
30 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'What is populism?' in Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser ​Populism: A Very Short Introduction​ (New York, 2017; online edn, Very Short Introductions 
online, Feb. 2017).  
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revolve around the concept of sovereignty. However, the two terms can be conflated and some               31
may criticize populism when they actually are addressing exclusionary nationalism, the creation            
of in-groups and out-groups based on ethnic-cultural background. The uniqueness of populism is             
that it aims to represent “the people” across national borders, while nationalism, though can also               
represent groups that extend through borders, is intrinsically tied to a nation, in many cases tied                
to a specific territory. On the other hand, according to de Cleen, in the European context the two                  
have been reconciled in the populist right embracing the ideology of exclusionary nationalism in              
the form “protecting” European identity against Islamisation. Moreover, the authors of the            32
Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies state that the most convincing interconnectedness of            
populism and nationalism is manifested in the European radical right-wing parties, whose            
ideology consists of authoritarianism, nativism, and populism. This interconnectedness of          33
ideologies in modern radical right-wing European politics is the phenomenon that the paper             
attempts to explain, and for the large part will refer to. Despite the challenge of defining concepts                 
and the danger of conflating them, it is important to acknowledge that such challenge is               
inescapable due to the “thin ideology” nature of populism and its easiness of attaching itself to                
other ideologies, including nationalism, and therefore the two should be used with caution and in               
alignment with the political movements or politicians’ ideological principles. 
31 Sovereignty is defined here as the power to make political decisions independently.  
32 Benjamin de Cleen. “Populism and Nationalism.” ​Final Draft of a Chapter to Be Published in the 
Handbook of Populism, Edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and 
Pierre Ostiguy. Oxford: Oxford University Press (in Press, 2017).  
33 Page 6: Brown, Thomas. “Populism and Nationalism: Implications for the International Order.” ​House of 
Lords Library Note ​, UK Parliament, 12 Jan. 2017.  
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Empirical Background  
The empirical background section first examines the commonalities in the historic           
background of the three case studies: post-communist transition and the accession to the EU in               
2004. Then this section analyzes the empirical background of each case with specific references              
to political parties and politicians. From the empirical background of the examined CEECs a              
common pattern includes being gaining independence through democratic protest from the           
Soviet Union and then undergoing a period of democratic transition, with common measures             
including “shock therapy” in the economic realm and change of electoral systems and lustration              
in the political realm. Another pattern includes a presence of a pro-EU government in power               
post-independence, usually led by some of the leaders who became prominent during the             
transition, and a shift to a Eurosceptic government some time after joining the EU. There are                
differences in the economic development of the states, which arises from economic advantages             
of the state, policy during the Soviet times, and the economic measures that were employed               
during the transition. Although strong support for populist politicians is common across the three              
cases, the design of political systems, bilateral relations with the EU, individual politicians’             
scandals, and the unique nature of civil society and political participation stand out as prominent               
differences in the examined cases of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic.  
Post-Communist Transition 
“Transition” is used to describe the period of political, economic and social            
transformation that has occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union in previously communist              
countries. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia were considered Satellite States of            34
34 Balcerowicz, Leszek. “Post-Communist Transition: Some Lessons.” ​Institute of Economic Affairs​, 2002. 
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the Soviet Union, and have regained their independence in 1989 after a series of revolutions and                
protests against the Soviet rule. The changes to come were foreshadowed by the programs of               
glasnost and ​perestroika. After the fall of the state controlled economy, transition countries had              35
undergone the process of privatization, market-oriented reform, emergence of private          
entrepreneurship, and construction of social structures and new institutions. Although initial           
conditions are important in explaining the divergence of the outcomes of transition, political and              
economic decisions illuminate this difference. It is important to note that out of 28 post-Soviet               36
states, 8 have emerged as consolidated democracies in the status quo. Eastern and Central              
European states have demonstrated a convergence with EU-15 countries on quality of democracy             
and economic affluence. Some attribute the democratization of Eastern and Central Europe to             37
structural factors such as location, level of development, and the influence of external actors. In               
the case of CEECs, those factors include choosing democratic systems during transitions, as well              
as gravitating towards Western democracy through engagement with EU and NATO. The            38
dissolution of the economic system that united the Soviet Union (Council for Mutual Economic              
Assistance), a large welfare state, and other factors have resulted in economic downturn, high              
inflation, and recession among the post-Soviet states. The post-Soviet CEECs success in            
economic development relative to the other post-Soviet states can be explained by an adoption of               
35 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi, Krzysztof Krogulski and an IMF Staff Team. “25 Years of 
Transition Post-Communist Europe and the IMF: Regional Economic Issues Special Report.” ​IMF​, IMF, 
Oct. 2014. 
36 Pages 13-14: Balcerowicz, Leszek. “Post-Communist Transition: Some Lessons.” ​Institute of Economic 
Affairs​, 2002. 
37 Ekiert, Grzegorz. “Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations.” ​World Politics Review​, 20 Mar. 
2012 
38 Ibid.  
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more front-loaded and bold economic reforms, including “shock therapy”. The accession to the             39
European Union had also contributed to a facilitation of market economic reforms and adoption              
of democratic principles by political elites.  
2004 Enlargement of the European Union 
In 2004, the EU welcomed 10 new members, making it the largest expansion in the               
history of the supranational union. Eight of the new members were former Soviet states. This               40
enlargement is referred to as the Big Bang Enlargement due to the unprecedented number of               
states joining simultaneously. ​The accession of 2004 ​brought the EU population to 450 million.              41
The first steps of negotiations with the European Union started in 1988 with the permission               
given by Gorbachev to Comecon countries to negotiate with the EEC, and later with the Phare                
programme (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy) in 1989. The              
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was created in 1991 to better aid             
post-Soviet countries in economic development. The former Soviet CEECs started to apply for             
membership in the EU since mid-1990s. European Association Agreements were signed on a             
bilateral basis. In order to join, the states needed to fulfill economic and political criteria, as well                 
as implement the ​acquis​. The abovementioned criteria that were necessary to be met for              42
admission to the EU have later become known as the Copenhagen Criteria, which included stable               
democratic institutions, rule of law, protection of human rights, as well as protection of              
39 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi, Krzysztof Krogulski and an IMF Staff Team. “25 Years of 
Transition Post-Communist Europe and the IMF: Regional Economic Issues Special Report.” ​IMF​, IMF, 
Oct. 2014. 
40 CNN World. “EU Welcomes 10 New Members.” ​CNN​, Cable News Network, 1 May 2004.  
41 Ibid.  
42 CVCE. “European Community Aid to the Former Eastern Bloc.” ​CVCE by Uni.lu​, The University of 
Luxembourg’s CVCE.eu, 2015.  
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minorities. Economic criteria included “a functioning market economy and the ability to cope             43
with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU”. Institutional requirements consisted            
of implementing the acquis, adherence to the political, economic, and monetary union, as well as               
fulfilling the responsibilities posed by membership. Thus, the EU conditionality for CEECs was             44
focused mainly neo-liberal economic reform and adoption of EU-compatible governance. The           45
CEECs and the EU were in regular contact to evaluate progress on the EU accession criteria. 
There were several critical evaluations of the accession process itself, as well as             
highlighting of the difficulties that hampered the process. There was opposition to Eastern bloc              
membership posed by EU-15, as well as challenges the accession would pose to the EU               46
structure. The EU had to make internal changes outlined in the Treaty of Nice (2000), such as                 
changes to the composition of Commission and in regards to majority voting in anticipation of               
the accession of the Eastern bloc. According to Pridham, some claim that the EU criteria were                47
too stringent and inflexible in light of the historical context of political uncertainty and economic               
downturn of transition, while others contend that the transition process was facilitated by the              
accession and EU membership has been an important factor in explainings its relative success              
among CEECs. The European Commission was caught in the “democratic deficit” through not             
43 When referring to democracy and democratic norms in this paper, the definition based on the 
Copenhagen criteria is employed, focusing on liberal democratic ideology.  
44 “Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria).” ​Glossary of Summaries - EUR-Lex​, EUR-Lex Access to 
European Union Law. 
45 Jimmy Oliver Milanese. “Europeanization in Central Eastern European Democratic Transition: a 
Multi-Level Explanation Approach.” ​Paper Prepared for Presentation at the YEN Research Meeting 
November 2 -3, 2001 Siena, Italia. 
46 Page 15: Cameron, David R. “The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe*.” ​Center 
for European Studies Central and Eastern European Working Paper Series #60​, Archive of European 
Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 2004. 
47 Page 2: Cameron, David R. “The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe*.” ​Center for 
European Studies Central and Eastern European Working Paper Series #60​, Archive of European 
Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 2004 
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having a standard of democracy, but a “list” system for monitoring political conditions, and also               
responding to conditionality in a bureaucratic manner rather than a political one. However, it              
should be credited that the Commission had reformed its approach to conditionality, especially in              
the question of democracy,  as a result of the experience of welcoming the Eastern bloc.  48
The EU conditionality required serious political and economic changes that had effects            
on the CEECs development that were not a part of the transition process. ​For example, during the                 
Monitoring Reports, the EU would demand immediate action on certain policy areas for member              
states, such as adherence to agricultural laws. ​The conditionality ​applied to CEECs also had a               49
pervasive effect on new institutions and policies by transforming domestic political behaviours.            50
The overall attitude of the European Commision was an assertion that pressure to adhere to the                
acquis would not be reduced after membership, though shortcomings would not delay the             
accession process, in the end requiring compliance with the acquis. The difficulties of the              51
accession witnessed by citizens had resulted in an ambivalence of public opinion towards the              
process, and later contributed to the increased support for Eurosceptic politicians and parties             
among the Eastern bloc. Such politicians and parties have also gained support among             
constituency in at the time 25 members of the EU, which was clearly evident through the                
48 Geoffrey Pridham. “ Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe: the European 
Dimension.” ​Paper for European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), University of Granada, 14-19 
April 2005, Workshop on The Performance of Democracy in Central & Eastern Europe​. 
49  Pages 3-4: Cameron, David R. “The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe*.” 
Center for European Studies Central and Eastern European Working Paper Series #60​, Archive of 
European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 2004. 
50 Jimmy Oliver Milanese. “Europeanization in Central Eastern European Democratic Transition: a 
Multi-Level Explanation Approach.” ​Paper Prepared for Presentation at the YEN Research Meeting 
November 2 -3, 2001 Siena, Italia. 
51 Pages 3-4: Cameron, David R. “The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe*.” ​Center 
for European Studies Central and Eastern European Working Paper Series #60​, Archive of European 
Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 2004. 
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example of 2004 European Parliamentary elections. ​Despite of the difficulties posed by the             52
accession process, the former Soviet states joined the European Union officially on May 1st,              
2004, after the process of ratification of the 2003 treaty has taken place. The Big Bang                
enlargement was met with celebrations across Europe. The President of Poland at the time has               
commemorated the event as a “​... dream is becoming reality​” of Poland reuniting with its               
European family. The Big Bang enlargement welcomed Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,            53
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, while Bulgaria and Romania            
had joined with a delay in 2007.  
Historical and Political Background of Case Studies in the 20-21st Century 
Poland 
Poland has entered the 20th century as a nation with partitioned territory among Russia,              
Prussia, and Austria. After World War I, the Reconstruction of Poland took place. During WWII,               
Poland was invaded by both Nazi Germany and Russia, with land split between the two               
according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Poland had suffered dramatic losses of millions of             
citizens during World War II. After World War II, Polish People’s Republic as a part of the                 
Soviet Union was under communist rule until 1989. The Soviet system began to be challenged               
with the 1970s workers movement “Solidarity”, headed by Lech Walesa and supported by the              
Catholic Church, and in 1989 Poland regained its independence. Lech Walesa was elected             
President of Poland in 1990 and market reforms and privatization were launched. The             
Balcerowicz Plan, named after Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, began the “shock therapy”            
52 Page 9: Cameron, David R. “The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe*.” ​Center for 
European Studies Central and Eastern European Working Paper Series #60​, Archive of European 
Integration, University of Pittsburgh, 2004. 
53 CNN World. “EU Welcomes 10 New Members.” ​CNN​, Cable News Network, 1 May 2004.  
 
 
20 
of stabilization and liberalization of the economy. ​First free elections to parliament were held in               54
1991. Former communist party became “Social Democrats” and actively participated in political            
elections. In the realm of political changes, in 1990 an amendment to the constitution              55
established direct presidential elections, creating a system of a parliamentary cabinet model with             
a president elected by popular vote, which later had led to clashes between presidents and prime                
ministers. The political system was not consolidated in Poland until the beginning of the 21st               
century. It is often mentioned that the “generation of 1989”, or the political elite that was formed                 
during the fall of the Soviet rule in 1989, is still at the forefronts of the political scene and party                    
divisions in Poland today. The 1990s were a process of decommunization for Poland, during              
which a new order was constructed in CEECs throughout political, economic, educational and             
others sectors of society in order to establish a liberal-democratic system. Poland had adopted a               56
new constitutions in 1997 and became a member of NATO in 1999.   57
The 21st century was profoundly shaped by joining the EU in 2004. In the economic               
realm, GDP per capita of Poland has increased 7.3 times from 1990 to 2015, demonstrating a                
successful economic transition and the highest economic growth among all OECD states. After             58
accession, there was a rhetoric among older members of the EU about CEECs workers taking               
jobs away from their citizens as a result of free movement and protectionist measures.              59
However, the countries that opened their markets to migration from Poland the earliest, United              
54 Johnson, Simon, and Gary W Loveman. “Starting Over: Poland After Communism.” ​Harvard Business 
Review​, 1995 
55 Reuters. “Timeline: Key Events in Poland since End of Communism.” ​Reuters​, Thomson Reuters, 11 
Aug. 2007.  
56 Dudek, Antoni. “The Consequence of the System Transformation of 1989 in Poland.” ​Remembrance 
and Solidarity Studies (3rd Issue)​, European Network Remembrance and Solidarity, 19 Aug. 2015.  
57 Lambert, Tim. “A Brief History of Poland.” ​Local Histories ​, 2017.  
58 Cipiur, Jan. “Central European Financial Observer.” ​Financial Observer​, 15 May 2017. 
59 Sciolino, Elaine. “Unlikely Hero in Europe's Spat: The 'Polish Plumber'.” ​The New York Times​, The New 
York Times, 26 June 2005. 
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Kingdom and Ireland, haver reaped the highest post-accession economic gains. In regards to             60
internal politics, in 2005, Lech Kaczyński became President with the platform focused on             
combating corruption, and his election marked a shift in politics from pro-European to more              
Eurosceptic and conservative. According to Dabrowski, Polish citizens became polarized          61
between the Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS), a more nationalist and Eurosceptic party, and              
Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform, a pro-EU one. Another significant event for Poland was the              
tragedy of 2010, the presidential plane crash which was on its way to commemorate the               
anniversary of Katyn’ massacres, in which the lives of many prominent political figures of the               
country were lost. After the period of mourning, consequent elections were won by the Civic               
Platform party and Bronislaw Komorowski. In 2011, under the leadership of Komorowski and             
Tusk, Poland assumed a half-year long presidency of the European Council. The current             62
President of Poland Andrzej Duda comes from the conservative PiS party, and has recently been               
widely criticized for passing the controversial bill which bans from accusing “ ‘the Polish nation’               
of complicity in the Holocaust”. A Eurosceptic view is especially prevalent regarding the issue               63
of immigration, which is supported by the following statement by Prime Minister Morawiecki:             
“In terms of migration and quotas that were to be imposed on (EU) member countries we                
strongly reject such an approach as it infringes on sovereign decisions of member states” , and is                64
60 Fihel et al as cited in Böröcz, József, and Mahua Sarkar. “The Unbearable Whiteness of the Polish 
Plumber and the Hungarian Peacock Dance around ‘Race.’”Slavic Review,Volume 76, Issue 2. Summer 
2017 , pp. 307-314. ​Cambridge Core​, Cambridge University Press, 7 July 2017. 
61  Epilogue: Dabrowski, Patrice M. “Poland : The First Thousand Years”, Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central.  
62 Ibid 
63 Santora, Marc. “Poland's President Supports Making Some Holocaust Statements a Crime.” ​The New 
York Times​, The New York Times, 6 Feb. 2018. 
64 Marcin Goclowski, Krisztina Than. “Hungary, Poland Demand Bigger Say in EU, Reject Its Migration 
Policy.” ​Reuters​, Thomson Reuters, 3 Jan. 2018. 
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supported by Eurosceptic citizens. Others accuse the Kaczynskis, leaders of PiS, for creating a              
“demokratura”, or a Polish version of a mix between democracy and dictatorship.   65
Hungary 
At the end of the 19th century, Hungary was a part of a dual monarchy of “Austria the                  
empire, Hungary the kingdom”. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria,             
World War I broke out in Europe. Post-World War I, Hungary was partitioned and millions of                
Hungarians found themselves outside their countries’ original borders. Entering the war as an             
Axis power in 1941, Hungary was later invaded by the Germans in an attempt to sign an                 
armistice with the Allied powers. Hungary had lost many civilians during the war and suffered               66
serious economic damage. Hungary became a Soviet satellite state and was under communist             
rule until 1989. The anti-communist ​Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had led to the leadership of               
János Kádár, under whom Hungary became more open to free market measures and lessened              
political oppression, thus adopting a modified system referred to as “Goulash Communism” .            67
The opening of borders with Austria in 1989 to aid refugees to West Germany preceded the fall                 
of the Soviet rule. In addition, Open Roundtable Talks created in 1989, which were meetings               
among opposition groups (including the political parties SzDSz, Fidesz, MDF, the ​Independent            
Smallholders’ Party​, the ​Hungarian P​eople’s Party and others), had later led to a peaceful              
transition of power and multiparty system in the country. In 1991, the Soviet forces left the                68
country and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Former communists and liberals form a coalition              
65 Buckley , Neil. “Long-Term Polish Dissident Braced for Fresh Battle.” ​Financial Times​, 27 Jan. 2017.  
66 International Visegrad Fund. “Brief History of Hungary.” ​The Visegrad Group: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia​, (C) 2006-2010, International Visegrad Fund, 18 Sept. 2006. 
67 Pike, John. “Hungary History - 1956-1966 - Goulash Communism.” ​GlobalSecurity.org​, 2011.  
68  International Visegrad Fund. “Brief History of Hungary.” ​The Visegrad Group: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia​, (C) 2006-2010, International Visegrad Fund, 18 Sept. 2006. 
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after elections in 1990, and in 1998 a coalition under Viktor ​Orbán was elected. Hungary joins                
NATO in 1999 and Ferenc Madl is elected President in 2000. During the economic transition,               69
Hungary did not adopt a bold “shock therapy” approach as Poland, but took a more “gradualist”                
approach to transformation. The Bokros Austerity Package that included privatisation and           70
austerity measures was able to set the country on a path of sustainable economic growth.   71
In May 2004, Hungary joined the EU with a referendum held prior accepting membership              
with less than a 50% turnout. In 2006, a Socialist-led coalition under Ferenc Gyurcsany came to                
power (nominated as PM by the Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP), however, protest erupted             
against the Prime Minister Gyurcsany after a scandal of the party lying during campaign.              
Consequently, since 2010 there has been high support for right-wing political parties in             
Hungarian politics, specifically the Fidesz party and Jobbik. Viktor ​Orbán and the Fidesz won              
parliamentary elections in both 2010 and 2014. Controversial political measures such as            
restrictions on the media, registration of some NGOs as foreign organizations, and attempts to              
close down the Central European University cause concern about support for democracy in             
Hungary, especially from the EU. As opposed to the Polish government’s condemnation of the              
annexation of Crimea, the Hungarian government has spoken against sanctions on Russia and             
secured economic deals with Russia on the nuclear station at Paks. Serious disagreements with              
the EU on immigration and refugees persist. In the economic realm, Hungary had received 20               72
billion euros from the IMF, EU and World Bank to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. After                 
69 “Hungary Timeline.” ​BBC News​, BBC, 14 Feb. 2012.  
70 Slay, Ben. “‘Transition from Planned to Market Economy: Hungary and Poland Compared’: A 
Comment.” ​ScienceDirect​, Studies in Comparative Communism Volume 25, Issue 4, December 1992, 
Pages 335-340, 6 Nov. 2002.  
71 Page 1: Csizmadia, Lidia. “The Transition Economy of Hungary between 1990 and 2004.” ​Aarhus 
School of Business University of Aarhus ​, June 2008.  
72 “Hungary Profile - Timeline.” ​BBC News​, BBC, 5 Mar. 2018.  
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a policy of austerity measures, in 2012 the EU still had to suspend aid measures due to budget                  
deficit. Although Hungary has recovered from the recession, it showed the slowest economic             73
growth among the Visegrad countries and is heavily dependent on EU funding. Therefore, the              74
Hungarian case stands out with the severity of democratic backsliding and difficulty of economic              
recovery. 
Czech Republic  
Previously a part of Austria Hungary under the Kingdom of Bohemia, after World War I               
the Czech Republic became an independent state of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, then part of              
Czechoslovakia Sudetenland was overtaken by Germany through the Munich Agreement, and           
later Czechoslovakia was fully invaded and Slovakia seceded. After WWII, ​Czechoslovakia was            
established as a country. The communist party gained popularity in Czechoslovakia,           
consolidated power, and later organized a coup in 1948. Until 1989, the country remained a part                
of the communist Eastern bloc. The 1960s marked a time of political and economic liberalization               
under Alexander Dubcek, however, it was thwarted by the Soviet invasion of 1968. The fall of                
the Soviet rule was preceded by the Velvet Revolution, or protests led by Czech citizens against                
the communist government, and was later followed by the “Velvet Divorce”, the peaceful             
separation of Slovakia. Vaclav Havel, a prominent figure in the resistance, became the first              
President of independent Czech Republic. The economic shift in the country was made through              75
two voucher reforms, or privatization conducted through the distribution of low priced shares of              
73 Ibid.  
74 The Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office economic study results, according to Hungarian online news 
portal napi.hu., as quoted in Keszthelyi, Christian. “Hungary's Economy Heavily Depends on EU Funds, 
Study Finds.” ​Budapest Business Journal​, 30 Mar. 2017. 
75 “Czech History.” ​CzechSite: Czech History​, CzechSite Travel Guide , 2017. 
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previously communist owned industry to citizens. Although at first the former Soviet republic             76
showed strong economic growth, even deemed as the “Czech miracle”, the trend was reversed by               
the 1997 economic crisis and subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. In the              77
political scene, two major parties stand out: the Czech Social Democratic Party (center-right) and              
the Civic Democratic Party (center-right, Vaclav Klaus’ ODS, emerged from Civic Forum            
created by Havel on the basis of civil society g​roups during Velvet Revolution). The Czech               78
Republic joined NATO in 1999.  
In the realm of economics, Czech Republic has experienced significant economic growth            
after the end of 1990s crisis and consequent austerity measures. Although some falterings             
occurred, sustainable growth and economic rebounds have led to the former Soviet state             
becoming one of the fastest-growing in Europe with a standard of living higher than other               
post-communist CEECs. The Czech Republic was able to avoid some of the downturn from the               
2008 European debt crisis because the country was not a part of Eurozone but was able to enjoy                  
the benefits of an open market, and currently continues to retain its own currency along with                79
Poland and Hungary. As for the political scene, ODS and Social Democrats, as well as other                80
center to moderate left pro-EU parties, have been most prevalent until the emerged support for               
Eurosceptic groups, for the most part “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” (ANO) led by current              
76 Page 102: Janik, Zdenek. “Twenty Years after the Iron Curtain: The Czech Republic in Transition .” 
Juniata Voices​, pp. 99–107. 
77 Andrew Stroehlein with Jan Culik, Steven Saxonberg and Kazi Stastna. “The Czech Republic 1992 to 
1999: From Unintentional Political Birth to Prolonged Political Crisis.” ​Central Europe Review​, Vol 1, No 
12 13 September 1999 Special Feature, 1999. 
78 Hauner, Milan, and Miroslav Blazek. “Czech Republic.” ​Encyclopædia Britannica​, Encyclopædia 
Britannica, Inc., 13 Mar. 2018. 
79 Ibid.  
80 ODS and Vaclav Klaus were noted for voicing a Eurosceptic position. See DONALD A. HEMPSON III. 
“Becoming 'European:' The Diverging Paths of the Czech and Slovak Republics | Origins: Current Events 
in Historical Perspective.” ​Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective Vol. 2, Issue 11 ​, The History 
Departments at The Ohio State University and Miami University, Aug. 2009.  
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Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and the right-wing Freedom & Direct Democracy party led by              
Tomio Okamura. ANO had gained 2nd place in the parliamentary elections of 2013, and won the                
2017 elections, running on the issues of corruption, immigration, and anti-establishment. As for             81
the relations with the EU in the post-2004 accession period, Czech Republic held a rotating EU                
Presidency in 2009. There exists a mixed attitude in supporting EU cooperation, which was              
especially prevalent in the stances that Czech Republic took towards foreign policy issues such              
as war in Iraq and conflict in Georgia, at times conflicting with those from the EU. The                 82
economic benefit of EU membership while simultaneous public support of Eurosceptic PM            
Andrej Babiš demonstrates the overall CEECs dynamic that the paper attempts to explain.  
Potential Explanations  
The Transition-based Explanation  
Transition from communism, as noted previously in the empirical background section,           
was a profound economic, political, and institutional change. A closer analysis of those changes              
reveals the conditions that facilitated political mobilization and support for nationalist and            
populist rhetoric. Milada Anna Vachudova captures this profound and multi-faceted process of            
transition for citizens as a shift from:  
“...one-party rule in politics, planning in the economy, atomization in society, and            
the abrogation of human rights; the system was held together with police terror,             
the threat of invasion, ideology, job security, and social benefits. They had all             
81 Goeij, Hana De, and Rick Lyman. “Czech Election Won by Anti-Establishment Party Led by Billionaire.” 
The New York Times​, The New York Times, 21 Oct. 2017.  
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shed this system ... in order to build liberal democracies and market economies,             
where human rights, political pluralism, economic prosperity, and a cleaner          
environment would blossom...”  83
Firstly, the institutional shift led to the creation of unique CEECs institutions, in which the               
Soviet legacy was mixed with new Western style reforms in transitional countries. This term was               
coined as “recombinatory innovation”. The Soviet legacy had its effect during the transition             84
period because of its influence on “societal culture, ways of thinking, political ethics and              
decision making.” The transition process was hampered by citizens lacking some skills such as              85
entrepreneurial skills or sense of individual responsibility which are essential to the capitalist             
system. In addition to that discrepancy the way human capital was utilized by the two systems,                
many of post-Soviet citizens found themselves lacking the advantages of the communist system             
while not having redeemed the promises of the new system that they live in.   86
The rapid privatization and transfer to market economy had forced a severe cut of social               
benefits, including cuts in funding for schools, healthcare, and pensions. The incompatibility of             
the Soviet welfare system with the one that would have been required in the new market system                 
is exemplified in the disability pension cuts in Poland: the spending on them was twice as much                 
83 Page 1: Vachudova, Milada Anna. ​Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after 1989​. 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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no. Corvinus University of Budapest. 
 
 
28 
as the OECD average. This had led to an increased economic vulnerability among citizens and               
criticism towards the harshness of markets. Moreover, research supports that citizens who            87
could be considered “winners” from transition tend to support free market economy, and             
consequently are pro-EU, while the economic “losers” of transition are more likely to oppose              
membership. Economic decline caused by transition, before the market reform was able to             88
produce an economic rebound, produced an increase in poverty, inequality, and unemployment,            
which was a shock for a population that was used to equality and economic security.               
Economically induced public discontent among those vulnerable populations, exacerbated by the           
unequal distribution of benefits from growth, was later “preyed” upon by populist groups, in              
order to mobilize for support the “losers” of market reform and integration. Therefore,             89
institutional and human capital conflict, as well as the emergence of certain groups of “losers”               
from economic reform, in light of the specific welfare nature of the previous Soviet system, was                
a conducive environment for the increased support for populist and nationalist politicians who             
were able to demonstrate concern for the abovementioned issues of the segments of population              
economically disadvantaged by the transition. ​Populism is effective at making elites bring to             
attention issues they want to evade in politics, and therefore the economically vulnerable             90
groups from transition found the populist parties being the ones that brought to public light the                
87 Page 202: World Bank. “Eastern Europe’s Transition: Building Institutions.” ​Country Note E. 
PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION: A PUSH TOO FAR? (Pp. 200-206). Economic Growth in the 
1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform ​, World Bank, 2005.  
88 Page 569: Tucker, Joshua A., Alexander C. Pacek and Adam J. Berinsky, “Transitional Winners and 
Losers: Attitudes toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries.” ​American Journal of Political 
Science ​Vol.46 ,No.3, July 2002, Pp.557-571. JSTOR, 2012.   
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concerns that seemed to be neglected by pro-EU and economic liberalisation supportive political             
groups and politicians. 
The democratic transition has also affected political processes in a way that provided a              
platform for nationalist and populist groups. A democratic system may create a more conducive              
environment for national conflict, for example, due to the opportunity it gives to powerful              
nationalist groups for politicisation of their rhetoric, which was more limited to those groups              
during communist rule. ​The post-1989 period in the former Soviet Central and Eastern             91
European states is marked with parties organizing along the lines of ideological cleavages on the               
basis of their view on how the process of national modernization had to be conducted. ​In the                 92
post-Soviet CEECs politics, “​communists, socialists, neofascists, traditional conservatives, and         
populists” could be often found in groups of illiberal nationalists opposing democratic and liberal              
ideology. The political leaders and parties that were opposed to the communist rule in CEECs               93
often came to power after 1989. They embraced joining the EU, and democratizing as a part of                 
the Copenhagen criteria even if it was not in their best interest, because joining ​EU became the                 
central foreign policy goal of Visegrad countries. ​As noted in the empirical background, the              94
leaders of the revolutions and civic protests were supportive of joining the EU, led market               
reforms, and promoted liberal democratic values, and then became the political elites of many              
CEECs. However, it was easy for new parties to emerge and capture that electorate of “losers”                
91 Page 368: DAUDERSTÄDT, MICHAEL, and ANDRÉ W.M. GERRITS. “Democratisation After 
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from transition, and take the role of anti-establishment parties. The specific nature of             95
democratic resistance prior to 1989 and the process of transition, ​which had brought to power to                
liberal democratic and mostly pro-EU parties, allowed for nationalist and populist parties gain             
popularity when discontents arose over EU policy and other societal problems.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is as follows:  
❖ The Soviet past and its conflict with the democratization and transition has contributed to              
the resurgence of nationalism in the status quo. Populist parties fed off economic and              
political grievances of the “people”, the “losers” of transition as a result of market reform               
and democratization, and used it to mobilize support through a Eurosceptic platform            
while creating an opposition movement to the ruling pro-EU parties. The populist            
narrative of anti-establishment politics was conveniently utilized in such arrangement.  
Predictions of Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1 produces a set of predictions which includes an observed group of “losers”              
of transition that would actively support populist politicians. This group would have suffered             
from losing the Soviet welfare system, would lack skills necessary in the new system, and would                
express a nostalgia for some aspects of the economic policy during the Soviet Union. This group                
would be the one whose economic situation did not improve relative to others as a result of                 
transition. A common reference to this group in statements, as well as economic policy targeted               
at the group, would be conducted by nationalist and populist parties. It would be evident that                
pro-EU politicians would become the political elite, and later would be challenged by             
Eurosceptic parties. A polarization between parties based on political ideologies and stance on             
95 Papp, Roland. “Making Sense of Central European Political Parties.” ​Political Critique​, Krytyka 
Polityczna and European Alternatives, 13 Apr. 2016.  
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EU membership would be observed where the populist parties would pose as political             
opposition. They would manifest their opposition in anti-establishment statements of political           
parties and politicians.  
The EU-based Explanation  
The CEECs nationalist and populist parties were able to effectively mobilize in large part              
due to their Eurosceptic rhetoric. Although it could be argued that these parties could mobilize               
on the basis of issues such as immigration even in the absence of EU membership, it is often                  
noted that criticisms of giving up sovereignty to Brussels is an important part of the political                
rhetoric of CEECs. The example of Hungary demonstrates the abovementioned dynamic: after            
the referendum on rejecting the imposed quota on refugees, Viktor ​Orbán later used the results to                
pass constitutional amendments that would ensure that the nation state is the basis of EU               
decision-making. The speaker of the Polish Senate Stanislaw Karczewski has also advocated            96
for a European Union where “solidarity and national sovereignty can coexist”. ​As for the              97
citizens of Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, only a range of 31-53% of Eurobarometer              
respondents agreed that EU membership is a good thing for their country. ​Beyond seeing the               98
EU as a “scapegoat” for nationalist and populist parties, I aimed to find any reasons for public                 
grievances against the EU or any other factors such as EU policy that could have provided a                 
conducive environment for Eurosceptic rhetoric of nationalist and populist parties to receive            
96 Nič, Milan. “The Visegrád Group in the EU: 2016 as a turning-point?”. European View (2016) 15: 281. 
Springer Berlin.  
97 Stanislaw Karczewski as quoted in Euronews. “Poland, a Two-Speed EU and the Future of the Bloc in 
Central Europe.” ​Euronews​, 13 Sept. 2017. 
98 Eurobarometer results for 2011 for the question “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) 
membership of the European Union ...? (with options: is a good thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad, 
and don’t know)”: European Commission. “Eurobarometer Interactive.” ​PublicOpinion ​, DGs Public 
Opinion, 2011. 
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widespread support. It could be contended that grievances that accumulated during the prolonged             
accession period were used later by nationalist and populist parties as a mobilizing force. A               
common criticism of the EU was centered around the EU not fulfilling the promise of protection                
and return to European family of CEECs by delaying the accession and demanding immediate              
action on reform.  
The link between the resurgence of populism and nationalism and the EU could be              
framed around the supranational union indirectly influencing democratization and perceptions of           
democracy, which then later were utilized by nationalist and populist parties. A debate exists              
concerning the causal mechanism between democratization during transition and EU accession.           
Vachudova states that EU merely reinforced the Visegrad movement towards democratization.           99
Most CEECs have reformed political system towards representative parliamentary ones during           
transition to promote democratization. The EU could have affected the nature of democratization             
that might have lead to a critical view of the EU, and consequently, of democracy overall. It is                  
possible that EU accession with rigorous conditionality may cause the effect of strengthening             
executive and bureaucratic power in some states while widening the gap between political elites              
and citizens if parliamentary effectiveness and public participation are not reinforced. This            
dynamic is further amplified by the existent mistrust towards elites and institutions as a legacy of                
the post-Soviet past. For example, the EU approach to administrative reform in CEECs was more               
top down rather than based on participation or representation. Dyson and Featherstone argue             100
99 Page 81:  Vachudova, Milada Anna. ​Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after 
1989​. Oxford University Press, 2004. 
100 D. Bechev and S. Andreev, ​Top-Down vs Bottom-Up Aspects of the EU Institution- Building Strategies 
in the Western Balkans​, St Antony’s College Oxford, South East European Studies Programme, 
Occasional Paper No. 3/05, February 2005 as cited in  Geoffrey Pridham. “Assessing Democratic 
Consolidation In Central & Eastern Europe: the European Dimension.” ​Paper for European Consortium 
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that compliance with economic requirements during Europeanization empowers technocrats and          
therefore changes the political landscape of the State. In an already weak state of democracy,               101
bureaucratization and a lack of promotion of participation could have negatively affected the             
fragile process of democratization and citizens’ view of democracy. The EU approach to             
democracy for a long time was formalistic or legal, which was not fitted to the context of                 
inequality and corruption in CEECs, as the way that citizens perceive a political system is highly                
dependent on elite behaviour.  102
Concerns about the relationship between perceptions of democracy and the EU arose            
when Eurobarometer showed low results on satisfaction with the development of democracy.            
The score on a host of democracy-related questions ranged for years 1991-1998 as the following:               
for Poland - from 37 to 63%, for Hungary from 48 to 62, and for Czech Republic - from 60 to                     
77%. However, as for the public perception of democracy for 2004, the year of EU accession,                103
the average among CEECs respondents in favour of democracy was 57%, while 50% had              
positively evaluated the previous Soviet regime as evaluated on a public opinion survey. As              104
democratic transition was one of the main points of the Copenhagen criteria that CEECs had to                
overcome institutional and historical hurdles in order to comply with, the nature of EU              
for Political Research (ECPR), University of Granada, 14-19 April 2005, Workshop on The Performance 
of Democracy in Central & Eastern Europe​. 
101 Jimmy Oliver Milanese. “Europeanization in Central Eastern European Democratic Transition: a 
Multi-Level Explanation Approach.” ​Paper Prepared for Presentation at the YEN Research Meeting 
November 2 -3, 2001 Siena, Italia. 
102 Page 12: Ã​gh, Attila. “The EU Polycrisis and Hard Populism in East -Central Europe: From the 
Copenhagen Dilemma to the Juncker Paradox.” ​Politics in Central Europe​, vol. 13, no. 2-3, 2017. 
103 Table 6 based on Eurobarometer analysis on a host of questions by DAUDERSTÄDT, MICHAEL, and 
ANDRÉ W.M. GERRITS. Page 369: DAUDERSTÄDT, MICHAEL, and ANDRÉ W.M. GERRITS. 
“Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion.” ​IPG 4/2000. Pages: 361-376​, 
Bibliothek Der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2000.  
104 A public opinion survey results page 106 in Kornai János, ​Szocializmus, Kapitalizmus, Demokrácia és 
Rendszerváltás​ [“Socialism, Capitalism, Democracy and System Change”] year 2007, as cited in Flamm, 
László. “The Crisis and Eurosceptism in Central and Eastern Europe.” ​L'Europe En Formation​, Centre 
International De Formation Européenne, 10 Dec. 2012.  
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negotiations with post-Soviet states during accession could have also affected the way that             
citizens perceived democracy overall. It is argued that the “institutional tutors and pupils”             
dynamics of power relations between the EU and CEECs states was begrudged by the political               
and bureaucratic apparatus of former communist countries. The Eastern Bloc countries argued            105
that they were upheld to a rigorous standard of accession when they were only transitioning to                
democracy, while the EU was not as strictly monitoring its existing members’ corruption and              
abuse of minority rights. When CEECs tried to bargain for concessions referring to their              106
preceding disadvantaged situation, the attempts were not successful and the end result of             
negotiations disproportionately reflected the pre-existing member states’ interests. And lastly,          107
some even argue that the EU had an adverse effect on democratization in transition countries due                
to its own democratic deficit. The populist and nationalist politicians reminding about the             108
grievances against “arrogance” of the EU during accession negotiations, as well as appealing to              
the resentment towards democracy reflected by the relatively low Eurobarometer ratings for            
which the EU accession could have been one of the causal links, may have contributed to their                 
recent increase in popularity. The EU democratic deficit and arrogant bargaining during            
accession, as well as putting in a more favored position interests of EU-15 members, had               
reinforced a negative perception of democracy. 
105 Jacoby 2001 as quoted in Page 5: Ekiert, Grzegorz. “Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and 
Central Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Europe the EU Enlargement.” ​Acta Slavica 
Iaponica, Tomus 25, Pp. 1-28​, Masarykovy Univerzity, 2008.   
106  Geoffrey Pridham. “Assessing Democratic Consolidation In Central & Eastern Europe: the European 
Dimension.” ​Paper for European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), University of Granada, 14-19 
April 2005, Workshop on The Performance of Democracy in Central & Eastern Europe​. 
107 ​Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003) as quoted in​ page 5: Ekiert, Grzegorz. “Dilemmas of Europeanization: 
Eastern and Central Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Europe the EU Enlargement.” 
Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 25, Pp. 1-28​, Masarykovy Univerzity, 2008. 
108 Ekiert, Grzegorz. “Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Dilemmas of Europeanization: 
Eastern and Central Europe the EU Enlargement.” ​Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 25, Pp. 1-28​, 
Masarykovy Univerzity, 2008. 
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In addition, the processes during the post-accession period can demonstrate what have            
contributed to the democratic backsliding. Firstly, after the accession process was over, the             
motivation to consolidate democracies among Eastern bloc states has weakened. The EU is             109
limited in preventing democratic backsliding after members join, which it is allowed to do under               
Article 7, however, the conditions for triggering the article are very demanding. The “Juncker              110
paradox”, a term coined by Ágh to signify the inaction of the EU towards populism, including a                 
contradictory and weak response, is another reason that explains the flourishing of populist             111
and nationalist parties. Ágh argues that populist regimes, when in power, can formally follow EU               
rules and regulations, creating a “democratic façade” while simultaneously failing to consolidate            
democracy or promote liberal democratic norms. Then the regime may take more steps to              
de-Europeanize and de-democratize, through steps such as an attack on civil society. The weak              
response to populist tendencies and violations of the rule of law in 2010s in former Soviet states                 
had accumulated to a “polycrisis” by 2017, and the attempt of EU institutions to address hard                
populism at that point was deemed a “crisis of crisis management” and deepened the Core and                
Periphery divide in the EU, because the problems of the Core were put on a higher priority than                  
addressing democratic backsliding in the Periphery. The resurgence of Euroscepticism could           112
be seen both through a failure of leaders of former Soviet states to think strategically about their                 
place in the EU and of the EU leaders and institutions at addressing the problems of democratic                 
109 Judy Dempsey. “The EU's Flawed Eastern Enlargement.” ​Carnegie Europe​, Carnegie Endowment , 27 
Feb. 2018.  
110 Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014.” 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung European Union​, 10 June 2014.  
111 Page 26: Ã​gh, Attila. “The EU Polycrisis and Hard Populism in East -Central Europe: From the 
Copenhagen Dilemma to the Juncker Paradox.” ​Politics in Central Europe​, vol. 13, no. 2-3, 2017. 
112 Ibid.  
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consolidation. Therefore, the post-accession weaknesses of the EU in addressing populism and            113
promoting a genuine democratic consolidation could be viewed as another reason for the             
resurgence of nationalism and populism.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is as follows:  
❖ History of EU accession, specifically bargaining and the negative effect of conditionality            
on democratization, had led to a negative public perception of the EU and democracy.              
Grievances against the EU were used by populist parties to mobilize directly, and could              
also have contributed to their popularity indirectly as an alternative to democracy that             
CEECs citizens perceived through an EU lens. A lack of mechanisms to prevent             
backsliding and to see through the “democratic facade” created by populist leaders, as             
well as a slow reaction to the crisis by the EU, had allowed nationalist and populist                
parties to flourish.  
Predictions of Hypothesis 2  
The set of predictions carried out by hypothesis 2 would include an anti-democratic             
stance of Eurosceptic parties that they would use to mobilize support. In addition, the populist               
parties would refer to the democratic deficit of the EU, as well as grievances from accession, in                 
their statements. It would be evident that populist parties in power put up a “democratic facade”                
while simultaneously taking actions towards democratic backsliding, which would not be           
opposed by the voters. The populist leaders would use the examples of the EU arrogance during                
bargaining, as well as the lack of power of CEECs as compared to the EU-15, in order to                  
promote Euroscepticism and gain support.  
113 Judy Dempsey. “The EU's Flawed Eastern Enlargement.” ​Carnegie Europe​, Carnegie Endowment , 27 
Feb. 2018.  
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Testing of Hypothesis as Application to Case Studies  
Poland  
Transition in Poland has created economic “losers” who support anti-establishment          
parties, which acted as opposition to the prevailing attitude of embracing the EU and integration.               
In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) electorate is centered around a patriotic and religious                
message, and stands in opposition to the Civic Platform’s pro-EU and cosmopolitan stance. A              
parallel could be drawn between the supporters of Law and Justice and UKIP or National Front                
supporters. ​Jarosław Kaczyński, the current leader of the party, has been achieving the support              114
of “the people” through an emphasis on the issues of immigration and social transfers. PiS had                
followed on its promises to voters and can take credit for the largest social transfer in Polish                 
contemporary history. Initiatives included: payments to parents for each child after the first one              
and for poor families for all children, reduction of the retirement age, introduction of free               
medical care for people over 75, tax-relief for low income individuals, and an increased              
minimum wage. However, it cannot be contended that the support of populist parties for              115
economic reasons comes from the “losers” of transition. After the fall of the Soviet Union,               
Poland has been one of the highest performing countries in Europe in regards to economic               
growth with the highest GDP per capita growth among all post-communist states. Since             
accession, wages have doubled, unemployment decreased by 12 points while poverty decreased            
by 5. Citizens also report a perception of an improvement in personal living conditions. It could                
be proposed that the PiS slogan of “Poland in ruins” has the element of constructing a negative                 
114 Zamoyski, Adam. “The Problem With Poland's New Nationalism.” ​Foreign Policy​, Foreign Policy, 28 
June 2016. 
115 Sierakowski, Slawomir. “Lessons from Poland on Populism.” ​World Economic Forum​, WEF and Project 
Syndicate, 3 Jan. 2017.  
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reality of the economic situation in the era of post-truth. ​Grzegorz Ekiert asserts that there               116
were no “losers” of globalization in Poland, because citizens have benefited economically from             
accession across the board. Sierakowski cites research to support that “political attitudes in             117
Poland do not align with whether one benefited or lost out during the country’s post-communist               
economic transformation. The ruling party’s electorate includes many who are generally satisfied            
with their lives...”.  Therefore, the economic part of the hypothesis could be questioned.  118
Reasons for the support of economic policy of populist parties lie in the unevenness of               
the economic growth, nostalgia for the social programs of the communist regime, and             
consequently the support of Eurosceptic parties for social welfare programs such as the             
abovementioned reforms by PiS, as well as the West and East discrepancy in the EU. A​ccording                
to Owczarek, the “shock therapy” contributed to an acute increase in income inequality, as well               
as to an increase in unemployment which resulted in a 20% rate in 2003 and 2004. Almost a                  
third of temporary working contracts of the EU belong to citizens of Poland, which could be                
attributed to lack of opportunities and uncertain labour markets. Free movement has also             119
brought more awareness to the East and West discrepancy to Polish citizens. Owczarek continues              
that the level of earning is three times lower in Poland than the EU average. The millenials in                  
Poland, who had the opportunity to receive education through scholarships, and the effect of              
programs such as Erasmus, resulted in interactions with their Western European peers. However,             
116 Owczarek, Dominik. “The Roots of Populism in Poland: Unsustainable Growth and Cultural Backlash.” 
CIDOB​, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Apr. 2017. 
117 ​Prof. ​Grzegorz Ekiert As quoted in Pazzanese, Christina. “In Europe, Nationalism Rising.” ​Harvard 
Gazette​, 1 Mar. 2017. 
118 Research conducted by Maciej Gdula of the Institute of Advanced Study in Warsaw as cited in 
Sierakowski, Sławomir. “How Eastern European Populism Is Different.” ​Project Syndicate​, 31 Jan. 2018. 
119 Owczarek, Dominik. “The Roots of Populism in Poland: Unsustainable Growth and Cultural Backlash.” 
CIDOB​, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Apr. 2017. 
 
 
39 
when Polish graduates entered the labour market with similar qualifications as their Western             
peers, their experience of doing unpaid internships stood in strong contrast to the lifestyle and               
expectations of the latter, resolving the myth of the equal economic opportunity between East              
and the West in an integrated Europe. Economic inequality is especially prevalent between             120
rural and urban areas in Poland, and the populist leaders capitalized on the urban and rural                121
divide. Therefore, it is the perception of one's economic status, not the actual level of growth,                122
amplified by the reduction of the previously strong social support of the communist regime, as               
well as the inequality between citizens that drives support for populist politicians in Poland.  
In addition to the economic inequality between “the elite” and “the people” that drives              
the populist agenda, a strong cultural misunderstanding even further contributes to the alienation             
in Poland. Seeing the West as a cultural threat, and drawing support from the Catholic Church,                
Polish nationalist politicians mobilize culturally marginalized groups by promoting a message           
that traditional curriculum and values are threatened by the EU. The divide between pro-EU              123
political elites and the mobilzed “people” is indeed a moral-cultural rather than a socio-economic              
one. Moreover, the Law and Justice party has effectively mobilized the lack of genuine              124
democratic consolidation by framing itself as the opposition to the establishment and “corrupt             
elite”. PiS argues that the previous ruling Civic Platform party has been led by a post-communist                
120 Ibid.  
121 Toynbee, Polly. “Poland's Steady Economic Progress Matched by Growth in Social Inequality.” ​The 
Guardian​, Guardian News and Media, 6 Apr. 2011. 
122 Feffer, John. “Welcome to Eastern Europe, the Birthplace of Trumpism.” ​Foreign Policy In Focus​, 12 
Dec. 2017. 
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Gazette​, 1 Mar. 2017. 
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elite, which had occupied and became entrenched in Polish institutions. The long incumbency             125
of Civic Platform, whose policy was even coined as “politics of warm water”, was opposed by                126
the PiS with a strong reform agenda, especially in the area of “draining the swamp”: Kaczynski                
called for eliminating the elite cartel comprised of anti-Polish “liberal-communist-criminal          
mafia” and PiS even passed a lustration law in 2006. The efforts to democratize, including               127
following the rule of law, protecting minority rights, and civic tolerance, in order to join the EU,                 
were followed by “the elite” to reap the economic and security benefits of membership, however,               
after the accession the incentive to continue was diminished. The approach to            
democracy-building focused on the belief that the EU-established institutions would “lock in”            
democratic patterns “was essentially a giant bet on the power of institutions”. Therefore, the              128
populist and nationalist agenda found support in the moral-cultural alienation, posing as an             
anti-establishment and action-oriented alternative to the pro-EU “elite” and citizen divide in the             
environment of weak democratic consolidation.  
Hungary  
The rise of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and abandoned support for the pro-EU MSzP could              
also be examined through the economic lens. The GDP per capita growth since transition, though               
125 Szczerbiak, Aleks. “How Will the EU's 'Rule of Law' Investigation Affect Polish Politics?” ​The Polish 
Politics Blog​, 29 Jan. 2016.  
126 A policy of providing basic goods and stability while refraining from new policy initiatives (page 2: 
Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “Populism and the Erosion of Democracy in Poland and in Hungary.” ​THE 
FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Stanford University ​, 24 Oct. 2017, 
pp. 1–7.)  
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THE FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Stanford University ​, 24 Oct. 
2017, pp. 1–7. 
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41 
lower than in Poland, had increased 3.7 times. However, Hungary presents a different case              129
where populism was able to more effectively utilize the economic situation to gain support, and               
lower growth occurred as contended by many due to a less strict adherence to “shock therapy”.                
Because of “goulash communism” and strong social welfare programs of ​Kádár​-era, the            
nostalgia for these programs became especially prevalent during the tumultuous economic           
transition. Hungary had high external indebtedness, and the downsizing had increased           
unemployment, increasing the rate of unemployment 11 to 13 percent in the early 1990s. Already               
existing income inequality trends were not caused, but rather gained momentum in the period of               
post-transition. It is contended that only 20% of Hungarian citizens could be called the “winners”               
of transition, mostly those with market-convertible skills. From 2003-2004, the Hungarian           130
government led by MSzP promoted a policy focused on investing in wages, which led to               
inflation and debt, as well as economic stagnation. Recently Orbán’s policy provided a             131
stronger economic support net which consequently gained popular support and did not cause             
economic downturn as predicted by its opponents. It is noted that “ ‘Hungarians felt they               
couldn’t spend anything for the last six or seven years,’ according to investor Gergely Szugyi​,               
‘But now they know what their mortgage will cost and their bills are a little lower, so they’ve                  
started to spend a bit more’.” It should also be emphasized that Orbán was able to make                 132
repayments ahead of time for Hungarian mounting debt from the IMF, although controversy             
129 From 1990 to 2015, see Cipiur, Jan. “Central European Financial Observer.” ​Financial Observer​, 15 
May 2017. 
130 Pages 87-89: Tökés, Rudolf. “Political Transition and Social Transformation in Hungary .” ​Afers 
Internacionals, Núm. 34-35, Pp. 79-101​, CIDOB, 1996.  
131 Page 89: Endre , Spaller. “The Political and Economic Transition in Hungary.”, ed. Rebecca 
Blocksome, Szabolcs Nagypal, Peter Sajda, ​Medi(t)ations and (Re)conciliation: Conflict Resolution and 
European Integration​. (Bratislava: Bgoi& WSCF-CESR, 2004), pp. 85–90. Keresztény Ökumenikus 
Diákegyesület (KÖD).  
132 Gergely Szugyi as quoted in Byrne, Andrew. “ 'Orbanomics' Confounds Critics as Hungary's Economy 
Recovers.” ​Financial Times​, Financial Times, 9 June 2015. 
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exists whether his economic policy will turn out fruitful in the long run. Measures that               133
received the support of the electorate by Hungarian populist leaders included cutting utility             
prices and forcing loss-making banks to repay 3 billion euros to mortgage payers. Other social               
welfare-oriented economic measures included a policy of keeping stable gas prices and            
compensations of crop farmers incurring economic losses. It can be confidently asserted that             134
the Fidesz-led initiatives appeal to the nostalgic feelings for the communist-era social economic             
support in face of the uncertainty created by market transition and fears of not having               
employment or skills necessary for the new economic order.  
Although Hungary’s transition has exemplary democratic origins with the famous Open           
Roundtable Talks, currently the situation in regards to democracy in Hungary is perceived as the               
most in danger among CEECs with profound changes to freedom of the judiciary and a rise in                 
extremist attacks on religious and ethnic minorities. The social support for populist parties is              135
the highest in Hungary among CEECs. One reason the backsliding in democratization            136
occurred in Hungary could be that in contrast to other case studies, the ruling pro-EU coalition                
was defeated by the populist parties not only due economic or ideological reasons, but also due                
to a scandal in the highly sensitive area of corruption. The leader of the pro-EU Democratic                
Coalition Ferenc Gyurcsány resigned in 2006 due to the party’s failure to recover the Hungarian               
133 Byrne, Andrew. “ 'Orbanomics' Confounds Critics as Hungary's Economy Recovers.” ​Financial Times​, 
Financial Times, 9 June 2015. 
134 Ilie, Cornelia. “Populism in Post-Communist Romania and Hungary: Representing Cultural and Political 
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2016, 21 Aug. 2016. 
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economy from crisis and because of being caught lying to citizens about the true state of                
economy during a broadcast speech at a party meeting, which caused public outrage and a               137
sharp increase in political polarization in the country. Due to an inherited mistrust towards              138
political elites from the Soviet times, such scandal could have shaped the public opinion of               
pro-EU groups and the EU in general. Fidesz was able to capture the role of the                
anti-establishment party, especially in light of the scandal involving a party that had overseen              139
the accession process. By 2014 elections Fidesz was actively engaged in criticizing “the Brussels              
elite and bureaucracy, the technocrats and later Jean-Claude Juncker in person”, and participated             
in serious sovereignty debates with the European Commission. However, it is difficult to find              140
a direct correlation between the behaviour of actors during the accession process and a negative               
perception of democracy.  
The grievances used to mobilize against the EU relate closely to the history of the               
Socialist coalition acquiring debt and the response to EU immigration policy. A €20 billion              
credit had to be taken out from the troika of the IMF-World Bank-EU to support the                141
Hungarian economy. According to Richter, after this 2008 rescue package, the populist            
government changed the strategy from austerity measures and severe cuts to “economic growth             
first and then a balanced budget”, declaring “a war on public debt”. However, disagreement exist               
whether Hungary would be able to sustain growth without unpopular austerity measures to the              
137 Freeman, Colin. “Hungary's Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany Resigns.” ​The Telegraph​, Telegraph 
Media Group, 21 Mar. 2009.  
138 FERENC LACZÓ. “Populism in Power in Hungary.” ​Eurozine​, Razpotja (Spring 2018) (in Slovene) / 
Eurozine (in English), 29 Mar. 2018.  
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pension systems and other welfare programs, which Fidesz during election claimed as            
unnecessary. As alluded to previously, the populist economic strategy drew support from the             142
standpoint of giving the freedom to citizens from austerity measures that were reducing the              
already shrinked from economic transition social support net. In addition, it allowed the populists              
to demonstrate that they did not waver under the EU, IMF and World Bank pressure by                
conducting a different policy that was not consistent with the one dictated by the international               
organizations, which was able to both stabilize the economy and protect the interests of its               
citizens foremost, although questions about the effectiveness of the populist measures in the long              
run remain. Hungarian economic situation contributed to the increased support of the populist             
criticism of the “Brussels elite”. As in regards to the question of immigration, the Hungarian               
government is one of the most immigration-opposing states of the EU. Immigrants would use              143
Hungary as a transit state to move further West. The immigrant appeal approval at first               144
instance of Hungary is the lowest among all members of the EU. Two reasons are proposed to                 145
explain the Orbán government’s appeal to the anti-immigrant sentiment: according to the            
hypothesis proposed by Stein, “Orbán securitizes the refugee crisis as an existential threat to              
Hungary and by constructing a social identity model, he maximizes the impact the politicization              
142 Richter, Sándor. “The Chokehold of Populism - Hungary's Economy.” Edited by Petra and Evan 
Mellande, ​Heinrich Böll Foundation​, The German Version of the Article Was Published in: Manfred 
Sapper and Volker Weichsel (Eds.): Quo Vadis, Hungaria? Kritik Der Ungarischen Vernunft 
(OSTEUROPA, 12/2011), 22 May 2012. 
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2018. 
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of the situation which then results in more support of his party”. The other reasons stems from                 146
the populist government utilizing the lack of a easily accessible and pragmatic plan to the               
immigration issue from the EU as a contrast to the direct and active approach of Fidesz as a way                   
to demonstrate their legitimacy over the ineffective “elite”: Orban blamed the EU for a failure to                
handle the crisis, came up with six suggestions to end the issue for the EU summit, and the                  147 148
public approval of Fidesz rose as a result. Therefore, the parties indeed use the lack of                149
coherence of EU policy, especially in regards to immigration and economics, and the EU              
democratic deficit as a way to demonstrate more credibility and political legitimacy in governing              
“the people” over “the elite”. 
Czech Republic 
The effects of transition in the realm of economics have manifested themselves in the              
resurgence of nationalism and populism in the political arena of the country, but not necessarily               
as a result of the mobilization of transition “losers”. The Czech Republic has an advantageous               
economic position due to its industrial development and the transition process has been             150
claimed as a “miracle” in part due to the ability of the Czech economy to retain low                 
unemployment rates even below other CEECs. The Czech Republic is also highlighted as the              151
country with the lowest income inequality in the EU. A closer link between the economic               152
146 Stein as cited  in page 26 Zsolt Marton. “Populism and the Refugee Crisis The Communication of the 
Hungarian Government on the European Refugee Crisis in 2015-2016 .” ​Malmo University Faculty of 
Culture and Society ​, Media and Communications Masters Thesis, 2017. 
147 Index.hu as cited in Ibid, 11.  
148 Joób as cited in Ibid, 11.  
149 Közvéleménykutatók.hu as cited in Ibid, 11.  
150 ​“​The Facts About The Czech Republic And Its Strengthening Economy | GDP.” ​Emerging Europe​, 
2018. 
151 Page 36: Robert J. Gitter and Markus Scheuer. “Low Unemployment in the Czech Republic: ​Miracle​ or 
​Mirage​?” ​U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics​, Monthly Labor Review August 1998 Pages 31-37, Aug. 1998. 
152 Patricolo, Claudia. “New Report Claims Czech Republic Has Lowest Inequality in EU.” ​Emerging 
Europe​, 5 Feb. 2018. 
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situation and rise of populism had resulted from a 2006 incident and also appeals more to the                 
notion of the social benefits net and relations between the political elite and citizens. The Civic                
Democratic Party (ODS) has lost popular support in the country due to its emphasis on reducing                
the state debt through austerity measures, but the protests have been especially fueled by              153
misrepresentation of the economic situation, which did not require such strict measures, as well              
as the determination to pursue such measures without the regard for potential social costs. This               154
demonstrates that the social net reduction as the result of transition had influenced the loss of                
support for neoliberal economic measures, as well as exacerbated the mistrust of elites from the               
Soviet time that was characterized by the non-acceptance of the elite’s legitimacy. Andrej Babi​š              
ran an anti-establishment campaign, opposing the traditional parties and portraying himself as a             
business persona outside of the world of politics that would be able to add efficiency to the                 
system. The pro-EU, liberal parties were supported in elections up until 2013, however, public              155
support shifted to Eurosceptic parties like Babi​š​’s ANO, many of which were established             
post-2010. There could be changes in the Czech case due to recent allegations of Babi​š of                156
fraud that have not yet been proven, which has the potential to negatively impact the support of                 
the politician whose campaign focused on the “clean up” of the Czech political arena. As for                157
now, the socially oriented economic measures of populist parties find strong support in the              
Czech Republic as they did in Hungary. 
153 Draxler as cited in page 5: ONDŘEJ CÍSAŘ. ​Czech Republic: From Post-Communist Idealism to 
Economic Populism​. International Policy Analysis. 
154 ​Císař and Navrátil as cited in page 5:  ONDŘEJ CÍSAŘ. ​Czech Republic: From Post-Communist Idealism 
to Economic Populism​. International Policy Analysis. 
155 Shotter , James. “Andrej Babis Victory in Czech Republic Raises Populism Fears.” ​Financial Times​, 
FT, 22 Oct. 2017. 
156 Drew Hinshaw and Philip Heijmans. “Upstart Pirate Party Remixes Czech Politics.” ​The Wall Street 
Journal​, Dow Jones & Company, 10 Nov. 2017. 
157 Muller, Robert. “Czech PM Babis Battles Fraud Charges as Cabinet Loses Confidence Vote.” ​Reuters​, 
Thomson Reuters, 16 Jan. 2018. 
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The accession process was referred to in Czech politics in statements meant to mobilize              
political support. ODS, though not a populist party, has used the reference to pre-accession              
negotiations in a populist manner when criticizing the Social Democratic Party for betraying             
Czech people by settling for unfavorable conditions and highlighted the negative aspects of the              
Treaty of Accession. ODS later attempted to increase its popularity based on supporting the              158
national interest and also on the Eurosceptic sentiment by standing against the adoption of the               
Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. However, rather than appealing to specific            159
grievances such as negotiations over accession bargaining, the criticism of the EU by the              
populist parties and politicians in the status quo focuses more on immigration and the power of                
“the Brussels elite”. For example, the populist statements of the current Czech President Miloš              
Zeman revolve around protecting “...Czech independence from overbearing Eurocrats in          
Brussels, from the bogeyman of Islamization, and from internal forces who sought to drive the               
Czech people apart”. He had asserted that the Czech society is divided among those who “he                160
represents and the ‘café society’ of Prague”, and demeaned journalists as a part of “the elite” that                 
needs to be restrained. Tomio Okamura has also gained popularity in light of anti-Islamization              161
statements and those such as “zero tolerance of migration”. The low unemployment rate             162
removes a possibility of resisting immigrants based on the fear of lost workplaces, rather, the               
anti-immigrant sentiment is strong in Czech Republic due to a power imbalance between the              
158 Adriana Klímková and Petr Sprinz. “Populism and Nationalism in the V4: Temporary Setback.” ​Global 
Politics​, Global Politics Časopis pro Politiku a Mezinárodní Vztahy, 2012.  
159 Ibid.  
160 Gardner-Gill, Ben. “The Czech Republic's Populist President.” ​Stanford Politics​, Stanford Politics, 20 
Feb. 2018. 
161 Miloš Zeman as cited in Gardner-Gill, Ben. “The Czech Republic's Populist President.” ​Stanford 
Politics​, Stanford Politics, 20 Feb. 2018. 
162 Okamura as cited in Gardner-Gill, Ben. “The Czech Republic's Populist President.” ​Stanford Politics​, 
Stanford Politics, 20 Feb. 2018. 
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country and Germany, which highlights the East-West divide as one of the EU-related induced              
causes of the resurgence of populism. According to Tucker, Czech Republic is economically             
heavily dependent on Germany, and the refugee quota question is seen as a policy forced by                
Germany on the Czech people, highlighting the negative perception of dependency and the             
power imbalance. However, even with such statements and sentiments, populism in Czech            
republic could be classified as a not far-right extreme ideological one. Nonetheless, concerns in              
regards to democracy, freedom of press and xenophobia in Czech Republic remain.   163
Analysis of Case Study Results  
The three presented cases demonstrate common patterns regarding the resurgence of           
populism and nationalism while simultaneously portraying the differences in populism's          
manifestations and causes. Among the three, one major difference is that the Czech and              
Hungarian leaders make provocative pro-Russia statements and actions and such were not            
present in Poland. All of the cases are similar in the fact that they had a ruling pro-EU party or                    
coalition and leaders, that usually either gained credibility and power during transition or had              
their roots originally from those who led the anti-communist resistance. The populist politicians             
and parties are similar with their anti-immigrant and anti-elite rhetoric, with an emphasis on              
providing social economic support for “the people”. However, though the shift in support of              
populist politicians happened in all of the three cases, the circumstances and causes for the shift                
vary. Though there are overarching causes to the shift, external circumstances can be as powerful               
in their explanatory power or complement the larger hypotheses. For example, although distrust             
of elites is a common theme in the cases, and is connected to the explanation of the influence of                   
163 Tucker, Aviezer. “Fifty Shades of Czech Populism.” ​The American Interest​, 23 Oct. 2017.  
 
 
49 
the Soviet past on the perception of the political elite as corrupt, the scandal involving a                
high-ranking politician in Hungary caused severe polarization of politics and damaged the            
political prospects of pro-EU parties, while the fraud allegations of the PM of Czech Republic               
might tilt the political scene in an opposite manner. The ideological explanation for the support               
of populism which is drawn on a cultural divide seems a stronger one for the case of Poland,                  
while economic development and austerity measures take more preference in explaining the            
popularity of Orban in Hungary. All of the three presented CEECs also have differences in the                
way that they interact with the EU: Poland having a fast-growing economy and labor contracts,               
the Czech economy being very dependent on the German one, and the persistent economic              
grievances of Hungarian people from the imposed austerity measures induced by the EU debt.              
Nonetheless, the Hungarian government stands out as the one whose populism has so far been               
the most confrontational in regards to the response it had caused from the EU.  
The first hypothesis argued that the resurgence of populism and nationalism was a             
consequence of the transition, specifically the conflict of the new institutions with the Soviet              
ones, the decrease in the social benefits, as well as the disappointment of the economic “losers”                
from the shift to a market economy, as well as the ideological makeup of post-communist               
politics that allowed populist parties to pose themselves as anti-establishment parties in a system              
of pro-EU party dominance. The presented case studies in this research suggests that the              
economy-based explanation does have explanatory power, but not a strong one due to how              
economically beneficial the transition has been for CEECs and the level of overall economic              
prosperity of the three case studies. Firstly, the predictions of the hypothesis about “losers” being               
a politically active group did not manifest itself at all in the case of Poland and was not strongly                   
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supported in the other two cases. Rather, the conflict with the reduction of social benefits, as                
illustrated and strongly supported in the paper, as compared to the Soviet time, drives support for                
socially oriented populist economics measures. Though this paper does use data on the increase              
in inequality and decline in social mobility as supporting arguments for the resurgence of              
populism, which also could be seen as the effects of the market economy, it should be noted that                  
there is a potential danger to drawing between them and populist support a correlation. Populism               
focuses heavily on the perception of the economic situation rather than real economic situation,             
and the control of the media outlets and trust from the voters only prompts citizens to believe                  164
that the economic situation is worse than it actually is. On the other hand, it seems that the                  
populist support could be derived not from mere negative criticism, but also from successful              
economic policy, even if it is ambivalent whether those measures will succeed in the long run.                
Populists gain credibility and support when their economic trajectory settles debt and promotes             
growth while simultaneously is more empathetic to the needs of the “people” with its generous               
social policies, and strikes deep contrast with the austerity measures of the EU-oriented             
economic policy of the pro-EU parties. Also, it should be noted that the historic memory of                
corruption as a vice of the communist system explains why the populist parties’ anti-corruption              
appeal gains wide popularity in CEECs in comparison to other Western states, and facilitates the               
antagonization of “the elite”.  
The political part of the first hypotheses was supported by the four case studies. Populist               
and nationalist parties did capture an anti-establishment position that contrasted with the pro-EU             
political leadership, specifically serving as opposition to the liberal market ideology. The case             
164 Torben M. Andersen & Giuseppe Bertola & John Driffill & Clemens Fuest & Harold James & 
Jan-Egbert Sturm & Branko. “Chapter 2: Economic Policy and the Rise of Populism - It's Not So Simple.” 
EEAG Report on the European Economy Pp 50-66​, CESifo Group Munich, 2017. 
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studies revealed deeper causes for why the parties captured the spot of pro-EU parties’              
competitors. Explanations such as the creation of a “democratic facade” instead of genuine             
democratic participation, as well as lack of policy and lukewarmness of pro-EU parties are              
presented in the case studies as viable causes to why the populist parties gained the opposition                
spot. Cas Mudde also adds that political de-alignment and protests are structural reasons due to               
which populist were able to gain popularity in changes of political preferences, which             165
Inglehart argues had occured post-industrial revolution. Also, an ideological shift occurred due            166
to the EU accession, because the parties that started having a strong stance on open markets and                 
society shifted from the ideology that they had before, such as Christian democratic and              
Conservative. Such changes led the parties to become non-ideological and policy focused, while             
the populists provided that ideological alternative for voters. Although the case of CEECs             167
could be highlighted as unique due to transition creating a certain political preference for pro-EU               
parties and an opportunity for populist parties to capture the spot of opposition as a result of                 
de-alignment and shift in ideological preference, the way that the populist parties mobilize on the               
basis of anti-establishment politics in CEECs is very similar to the way that they do in the cases                  
of Western populism. The appeal of the anti-establishment stance, therefore, is a strong             
explanation for the resurgence of populism across national borders.  
165 Cas Mudde interviewed by Weingartner, Benedikt. “‘The European Union Is a Victim of Its Own 
Success.’” Cas Mudde on Structural Reasons behind the Rise of Populism in Europe, 
#DialogueonEurope, 5 Dec. 2017 
166 Inglehart as cited by Cas Mudde in Weingartner, Benedikt interview of Cas Mudde. “‘The European 
Union Is a Victim of Its Own Success.’” ​Cas Mudde on Structural Reasons behind the Rise of Populism in 
Europe​, #DialogueonEurope, 5 Dec. 2017. 
167 Cas Mudde interviewed by Weingartner, Benedikt. “‘The European Union Is a Victim of Its Own 
Success.’” Cas Mudde on Structural Reasons behind the Rise of Populism in Europe, 
#DialogueonEurope, 5 Dec. 2017.  
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The second hypothesis argued that the resurgence of nationalism and populism should be             
examined in the Visegrad countries through the lens of their relative EU accession and              
membership in the supranational union. Specifically the argument was centered around the            
conflict between Europeanization, especially bureaucratization, and the new liberal democratic          
structures and institutions of CEECs, as well as democratic deficit in the EU. In addition, the                
power imbalance promoted by the accession process by the EU, as well as the East and West                 
inequality, had contributed to a negative perception of democracy, which is evident in the drop in                
trust in democracy from transition to accession recorded by the Eurobarometer survey. Lastly,             
the hypothesis asserted that the EU did not have a mechanism to prevent democratic backsliding               
and employed measures against populist limit to freedoms (“Juncker paradox”) once the country             
had lost the incentive to democratize after the conditionality was lifted. The case studies did not                
demonstrate a significant causal effects of the changes in institutional structures and democratic             
deficit on the resurgence of populism, as predicted by hypothesis 2. The case of the power                
imbalance was more supported by evidence, especially in regards of imposed austerity measures             
and economic policy. The East and West divide might drive the perception of economic              
downturn that populists seek in order to promote their message, as was mentioned in the case of                 
Poland where the freedom of movement only highlighted the severe differences between            
economic opportunities. The arrogance of the EU during accession was only mentioned when it              
was convenient for political parties to gain public support, but did not seem to have a prominent                 
position in Eurosceptic rhetoric of the status quo as outlined in the predictions. This could be                
explained by the fact that the CEECs have benefitted from accession in terms of economic               
growth and security, and thus the positive associations with accession and the benefits that the               
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countries reaped would outweigh negative criticism directed at the question of EU membership             
in general. In addition, the CEECs populists do not have a goal of leaving the EU, but rather aim                   
to maintain a Eurosceptic position, and therefore they focus on more current issues popular with               
Eurosceptics such as immigration and austerity measures in order to bargain for more             
sovereignty while preserving the benefits of membership.  
Lack of incentive to democratize and lack of measures to prevent democratic backsliding             
by the EU are not the causes of a negative perception of democracy, as predicted, but rather                 
effects of a larger populist battle against “the elites”. Firstly, a negative attitude towards              
democracy, or at least a willingness to support populist politicians in light of their              
anti-democratic policies, is more explained by the dominance of the pro-EU political elite in              
Visegrad countries post-transition, which promoted democracy. The negative perception of the           
pro-EU parties reinforced by populists could have driven the lack of trust in democracy and its                
negative perception. The ability of populist to claim that they represent “the people” while the               
liberal, democratic, pro-EU elites do not, as well as the antagonization of “the elite”, explains the                
support for populist politicians even outside of the CEECs. For populist politicians, it was easy               
to base their ideology as the one supporting “the people” first and the national interest, while the                 
Brussels elite was another “elite” which they could blame for shortcomings after they had to shift                
their focus from internal forces when they came to power. In this case, the power imbalances                
could have contributed to create antagonism between the EU “elite” and “the people”, which was               
further exacerbated by the already present distrust of elites inherited from the Soviet times.              
However, it would be unfair to state that the EU became a victim of the populist “elite seeking”.                  
The lack of one-to-one participation of EU citizens of CEECs in the EU decision-making              
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process, as well as the assertion of policy that was not tailored to the country's unique                
circumstances, gave advantage for the populist who employed actions more supportive of the             
local context. Therefore, the democratic deficit prediction of the hypothesis was supported by the              
analysis. For example, the way that populist leadership was able to pay off debts and promote                
growth by avoiding economic austerity measures has only supported the constructed notion of             
the EU as a distant and unempathetic “elite” that should not be a reference for representing “the                 
people”. The issue of immigration is also easily exploited in the larger populist framework of               
demonstrating “the elite” incompetence in governing “the people”. For the populists shutting            
down borders is a viable action step that prevents any immigration-induced problems in their              
countries, because they do not want to take responsibility for this larger European Union crisis               
and can shift the blame to the EU for being incompetent in addressing it. The rise of post-truth                  168
and simplification of issues to mobilize support both explain the resurgence of populism, as long               
as those issues allow populists to demonstrate that they are protecting “the people” from the               
elites, Brussels, Islamization, journalists, social welfare cuts... Therefore, populist parties and           
politicians do not have to refer to specific incidents during accession, grievances against EU              
power abuse, or more complex structural problems of the EU in order to draw support. 
Is Central and Eastern European populism unique?  
This paper aimed to argue that the resurgence of nationalism and populism in the status               
quo Central and Eastern Europe could be traced to democratic transition and the 2004 EU               
accession, the two factors present in the cases of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic. The               
question arises: did the resurgence of populism and nationalism in Europe occur in other cases               
168 Post-truth is defined by the Oxford Dictionaries as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which 
objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”: 
Post-truth. “Oxford Dictionaries.” ​Oxford Dictionaries | English​, Oxford Dictionaries, 2018. 
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that are either in the EU or those that have undergone the transition, as it did in the cases of                    
Visegrad 4 which are all examined in this paper except the case of Slovakia? Populism is gaining                 
popularity in Bulgaria, with parties gaining around 10% of the vote, while not being as popular                
in Romania, although both of these EU states have undergone a post-Soviet transition. States              169
such as Ukraine and Moldova, that have been a part of the Soviet Union but have not yet been                   
accessed to the EU, have experienced an anti-elite and anti-oligarchic political resurgence,            
specifically an anti-EU sentiment present in Moldova with the disillusionment in the pro-EU             
government that was dissolved due to rivalries between coalition parties. The cases of Moldova              
and Ukraine are unique due to the fragile state of democracy and transition as compared to                
CEECs. Among EU states that have not undergone a democratic transition, but that have              170
experienced a rise in populism, Scandinavian states experienced populist parties gaining up to             
20% of the latest vote share, as well as with their popularity growing fast in France, Germany,                 
and Netherlands. Populist parties currently do not experience such level of popular support in              
Spain, Greece, and Italy. The post-Soviet Baltic states have also experienced a rise in populist               171
social movements, among which are Labour Party in Lithuania and nationalist movements in             
Latvia. This analysis supports that the success of populism as a political ideology of parties is                172
not only a CEECs phenomenon, however, the region does have higher than average support than               
others and has distinctive features. The rise of populism in post-Soviet non-EU member states              
169 Tartar, Andre. “How the Populist Right Is Redrawing the Map of Europe.” ​Bloomberg.com​, Bloomberg, 
11 Dec. 2017 
170 TOMČÍKOVÁ, NELLY. “Populist Backlash In V4 Countries: Lessons To Be Learned For Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia.” ​Charter'97 :: News from Belarus - Belarusian News - Republic of Belarus - Minsk​, 
Charter'97, 30 May 2016. 
171 Tartar, Andre. “How the Populist Right Is Redrawing the Map of Europe.” ​Bloomberg.com​, Bloomberg, 
11 Dec. 2017 
172Mari-Liis Jakobson, Ilze Balcere, Oudekki Loone, Anu Nurk, Tõnis Saarts, Rasa Zakeviciute. “Populism 
in the Baltic States: A Research Report.” ​OEF​, Open Estonia Foundation and Tallinn University Institute 
of Political Science and Governance and Partners. , Nov. 2012,  
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demonstrates that populism may gain popularity even in a very weak state of democratic              
consolidation and can flourish even without the absence of the EU as “the elite” on the political                 
landscape. The strong presence of populism across Europe indicates that populism as an ideology              
is not unique to states with a Soviet past and a democratic transition, and the existing presence of                  
populism in states that have either of the two conditions supports that the two contribute to the                 
popularity of the political ideology. However, a heavy presence in CEECs with swiping electoral              
victories reinforces the notion that the Visegrad 4 have a unique condition that supports the               
flourishing of populism.  
The anti-immigration and anti-elite rhetoric is present in both cases of Western European             
and Eastern European populism, with politicians like Marine Le Pen and Sebastian Kurz             
receiving special attention as examples of populist leaders in the West. As mentioned previously,              
anti-immigration and anti-elite rhetoric unites the parties across Europe. Some claim, however,            
that due to the history of treating the minorities such as Roma as the “other”, Eastern populism                 
contains a more openly xenophobic and exclusionary rhetoric. In addition, the opposition to the              
main liberal pro-EU parties as “the other”, which was present in the cases analyzed in this paper,                 
is uncommon in Western Europe where Eurosceptic parties do not question the political             
legitimacy of their opponents. Western populism springs from a crisis in democracy as in the end                
of adversarial politics in Western countries and a lack of challenging of the established              
consensus of liberal values, whereas Eastern populism is a reaction to “mainstream” politics.             173
The issue of accusing pro-EU parties of not only not being representative of “the people”, but                
also not being a legitimate political opponent, stems from the previously mentioned absence of a               
173 Herman, Lise. “Is Populism in Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe the Same Thing?” 
Nouvelle Europe​, 5 Jan. 2018 
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“right” and a “left” party spectrum in the political system. The discussion falls into the right or                 
wrong spectrum, or “friend” or “foe”, which aids the populist discourse more than in the cases of                 
Western European states. Another important distinction lies in the nature of civil society,             174
which is not only weaker developed in CEECs than in Western Europe, but also is focused in                 
areas such as charity, religion, and leisure rather than political participation. While Western             175
and Eastern populist parties are not the same because “ populism is a discourse, and a discourse                 
adapts to its public and nourishes itself of its context”, Mudde argues that "differences between               
East and West (...) will soon be irrelevant given the homogenising effect of EU membership",               
however, some question whether that would be true in the future. Currently populist parties              176
continue to win over traditional parties only in CEECs.   177
Conclusion  
After thoroughly examining the resurgence of populism in Poland, Hungary and Czech            
Republic, this paper attempted to explain why populist and nationalist parties and politicians             
have been successful in the political arena of CEECs in light of a relatively recent EU accession.                 
The two proposed explanations, based on the effects of transition and the effects of accession,               
were partially supported by the testing of hypothesis through the analysis of case studies. It was                
found that though the idea of a transition “losers” electorate is not supported, the appeal to social                 
economic policy of populist parties is indeed caused by the loss of the social welfare net created                 
by transition to market economy through “shock therapy”. Another effect of transition, or             
174 ​Sierakowski, Sławomir. “How Eastern European Populism Is Different.” Project Syndicate, 31 Jan. 
2018. 
175 ​Ibid 
176Herman, Lise. “Is Populism in Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe the Same Thing?” ​Nouvelle 
Europe​, 5 Jan. 2018 
177 Sierakowski, Sławomir. “How Eastern European Populism Is Different.” Project Syndicate, 31 Jan. 
2018. 
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establishment of a pro-EU political elite, created a context in which populist parties could rally               
against “the elite” and “the establishment” more easily, especially if pro-EU parties or politicians              
had lost trust from their electorate due to corruption scandals. The predictions of the second               
hypothesis in regards to arrogance of the EU in accession bargaining were not supported by the                
findings at all, however, the idea of a EU democratic deficit was supported by the attempts of                 
populist parties to demonstrate EU incompetence in policy, such as in regards to the immigration               
issue or economic austerity measures. The important finding of the paper is that populist parties               
gain support by constructing a reality for their voters in the era of post-truth, and that reality is                  
centered around the same issues and rhetoric of protecting “the people” present in political              
discourse across European states. Therefore, the ability of populist and nationalist parties to gain              
the place of opposition in CEECs political arena and their generous social economic policy in               
light of recent economic transition best explain the causes for such strong support of these parties                
among the three studied former Soviet EU members. Recommendations include supporting           
efforts to create strong civil society in CEECs, combating the “democratic facades”, encouraging             
sensible economic policy, as well as the reducing the democratic deficit of the EU. Important               
areas of future research include comparative studies of populist parties outside of the European              
context and the issue of immigration in European politics, for these issue areas are this research                
paper’s limitations.  
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